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Abstract 
Many studies have argued the negative effects of external rewards on internal 
motivation while others assert that external motivation does not necessarily 
undermine intrinsic motivation. At a private university, students were given the option 
to earn bonus points for achieving mastery in the online homework systems associated 
with Statistics and Pre-Calculus courses. The results showed a significant difference 
in online homework grades and final exam scores, dependent upon when the incentive 
was given. The findings of this research suggest that college students thrive when 
incentivized. When compared to the students who were not incentivized, the 
incentivized group had a statistically significantly higher mean for both online 
homework scores and final exam scores. Many of the incentivized students chose to 
take the opportunity to earn the bonus points to increase the final semester grade, 
which apparently also helped to increase the content knowledge necessary for the final 
exam. 
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Resumen 
Muchos estudios han argumentado los efectos negativos de las recompensas externas 
en la motivación interna, mientras que otros afirman que la motivación externa no 
necesariamente socava la motivación intrínseca. En una universidad privada, se les 
dio a los estudiantes la opción de ganar puntos de bonificación por realizar 
correctamente las tareas de los cursos de Estadística y Pre-cálculo. Los resultados 
mostraron una diferencia significativa en las calificaciones de las tareas en línea y 
puntuaciones en los exámenes finales, dependiendo de cuándo se otorgó el incentivo. 
Los hallazgos de esta investigación sugieren que los estudiantes universitarios 
mejoran sus notas cuando se les incentiva. En comparación con los estudiantes que 
no fueron incentivados, el grupo incentivado tuvo una media estadísticamente 
significativamente mayor en las notas  de las tareas en línea y las notas del examen 
final. Muchos de los estudiantes incentivados optaron por aprovechar la oportunidad 
de ganar puntos de bonificación para aumentar la calificación final del semestre, lo 
que aparentemente también ayudó a aumentar el conocimiento del contenido 
necesario para el examen final. 
Palabras clave: Bonificaciones, Estadística, incentivos
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any studies have argued the negative effects of external rewards on 
internal motivation (Akin-Little, Eckert, Lovett, & Little, 2004; 
Harlow, Harlow, & Meyer, 1950; Leper, 1983; Rummell & 
Fielding, 1988), while others assert that external motivation does not 
necessarily undermine intrinsic motivation (Pittman, Boggiano, & Ruble, 
1983; Vansteenkiste, Lens, & Deci, 2006), including the Cameron, Banko, 
and Pierce (2001) synthesis of 145 motivational studies. The current 
literature further refines the external reward into that which is either coerced 
and controlling (Rassouli, 2012) with words such as “should,” “ought,” and 
“have to” (Vansteenkiste et al., 2006) or a reward that that is brought to 
fruition by autonomous motivation which is optional, volitional, and 
personally relevant (Black & Deci, 2000; Vansteenkiste et al., 2006; 
Vasteenkiste, Lens, DeWitte, DeWitte, & Deci, 2004; Rassouli, 2012). 
Behavioral theorists assert that when engagement is autonomous and 
voluntary, the extrinsic rewards enhance learning without ill effects 
(Rassouli, 2012). Autonomy-supportive contexts allow instructors to 
“empathize with the learner’s perspective, allow opportunities for self-
initiation and choice, … refrain from the use of pressures and contingencies 
to motivate behavior…” (Deci et. al, 1994, p.21). In such a context, rewards 
for low-interest activities may serve to increase interest and therefore also 
increase internal motivations (Akin-Little et al., 1986; Cameron et al., 2001). 
Despite a rise in concern of school psychologists over classroom reward 
contingency systems during the mid to late 1990’s (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 
1999a, 1999b, 2001; Kohn, 1993, 1996), the practice of rewarding students 
continues with vigor. Academic reinforcements are often given for academic 
output (Akin-Little et al., 2004) where the creation of “appropriate situation 
interest enhances students’ meaningful participation in classroom activities 
with long-lasting effects” (Rassouli, 2012, p. 87). Some studies have also 
determined that external rewards can be effective tools for enhancing 
learners’ motivation for learning (Akin-Little et al., 2004; Cameron, & 
Pierce, 1994; Rassouli, 2012). Some researchers have found that when 
motivation is increased, class participation and persistence over the short 
term are higher than those with a no-goal condition (Jung, Leung, & Miller, 
2016; Miller & Mallott, 1997; Vansteenkiste et al., 2006). Experimental 
researchers are hopeful that mere mention of the relationship of learning tasks 
to intrinsic goals tends to be beneficial to student learning, since knowing the 
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relevance of an activity can be a source of motivation (Vansteenkiste et al., 
2006).  
 More specifically, the use of incentives as a reward structure contingent 
on classroom performance has shown to produce greater degrees of 
adherence to performance standards than behaviors without incentives 
(Bailey, Rosnethal, & Yoon, 2016; DeVahl, King, & Williamson, 2005; 
Nonis, Ford, Logan, & Hudson, 1996; Miller & Mallott, 1997; Rousu et al, 
2015; Tudor & Bastow, 1991). Bailey, Rosnethal, & Yoon (2016) suggest a 
nuanced relationship “between grades, incentives, and subsequent academic 
outcomes” (p. 1548). One such form of an external reward to link those 
concepts is the ubiquitous bonus point pervasive in all levels of education. 
While the simplistic bonus score scheme can supplement any classroom 
activity to generate and embed intrinsic interest (Rassouli, 2012), it also 
informs students of a point contingency on some post-test performance 
(Miller & Mallott, 1997) toward improving course grades (DeVahl et al., 
2005) and the ultimate goal of mastering the learning materials (Rassouli, 
2012). The application of the bonus point structure as implied by many 
studies (Deci, 1971; DeVahl et al., 2005; Miller & Mallott, 1997; Rassouli, 
2012) is the core of the study at hand. In short, the impetus was to test the 
theory set forth by Rassouli (2012) which suggests that academic incentives 
“may in effect ignite internal motivation and therefore reinforce learners’ 
participation and deep learning” (p.87). 
 Bonus points were used as the motivating factor in the current study in a 
sample taken from a small private Midwestern university. Here, three years 
of students in Statistics and Pre-Calculus were given the option to earn 5 
bonus points awarded at the end of the semester for anyone who had a 100% 
on all of the online homework for the semester. In the first year, no bonus 
incentive was given. In the second year, incentives were optioned to students 
during the last 2 weeks of the semester, while in the third year they were 
given the option on the first day of class. The ex post facto observational 
design categorized my 203 students as either early incentivized, late 
incentivized, or not incentivized groups of students, then studied the means 
of their online homework grades and final exam scores. Further study into 
these groupings analyzed the potential correlation between final homework 
grade and final exam grade and the relationship status of when the students 
were incentivized and whether or not they completed the homework to the 
stated 100% level. 
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Methodology 
 
Participants 
 
The sample was comprised of 215 undergraduate students from Pre-Calculus 
(n = 24) and Statistics (n = 191) classes at a small private university who 
complete their assignments with the Pearson MyStatLab online homework 
system whose points account for approximately 25% of the semester course 
grade. Most of the students held sophomore status at the time of the class. 
After the course grades were turned in to the registrar, the students were first 
separated in to groups who earned the 100% on the online homework (n = 
66) or those that did not earn the 100% on the online homework (n = 149). 
The groups were then further refined into categories based upon when and if 
they were incentivized. The early incentives group (n = 60) roster derived 
from the fall 2016 roster and were those students who were told of the 5 point 
bonus incentive for earning a 100% on the online homework provision on the 
first day of the semester . The late incentives group (n =74) were the students 
from the respective fall and spring semesters of the 2015-2016 academic 
year; they were given the bonus incentive during the last two weeks of the 
semester. The initial group of students were those who were not provided any 
incentive to complete the semester, now termed as the no-incentives group 
(n  = 71), from the spring 2015 semester. Any numerical discrepancies from 
the total sample to the individual groupings were due to students either not-
completing or officially dropping the class. 
 
Analysis 
 
EXCEL was used to compute the statistical analysis of the first five research 
questions. The first question concerned finding a difference in the mean 
online homework score for those students who completed the performance 
criterion of earning a 100% on the online homework. The second point of 
research was similar in its relative question, but with respect to the final exam 
score: question two searched for a difference in the mean final exam score 
for those who did and those who did not meet the performance standard of 
earning a 100% on the online homework. Questions three and four parsed out 
more details than the previous two questions as the groups were sub-divided 
by the timeliness of the incentive. More specifically, the third research 
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question asked if there was a difference in the mean online homework scores 
for the early, late and no- incentive groups. The fourth research question 
asked if there was a difference in the mean final exam scores for the early, 
late and no-incentive groups. Question five sought out any relational value 
of online homework grade (regardless of time of incentive) to final exam 
score and question six pursued a relationship between when the incentive of 
5 bonus points was provided (i.e. early, late, no-incentive) and whether the 
students completed the 100% criterion standard for the homework. Specific 
statistical analyses were independent t tests assuming unequal variances 
(questions 1 and 2), one-way ANOVA (questions 3 and 4), correlation 
(question 5), and Chi Square test for independence (question 6).  
 
Results 
 
The results of the statistical analyses are a product of identical online 
homework activities taught by the same professor in the respective Pre-
Calculus and Statistics classes. The rigor, teaching methods, learning 
techniques, procedures for collecting data were identical. The activities were 
complementary to student learning and assessment (Deci, 1971). 
 For the first research question concerning the mean differences in the 
online homework grades for the incentive and no-incentive group, the results 
of the independent t test assuming unequal variances were significant. There 
were 65 observations in the incentivized student group, compared to 137 for 
the no-incentive groups. Their respective mean scores were 86.7 and 79.2 
with t(171)= 3.954, p<.001. The second research question asked about the 
same two groups of students, but identified the means of the final exam 
scores. Again, an independent t test assuming unequal variances showed 
statistically significant results with t(178)= 4.271, p< .001. The sample 
means for the final exams were 88.3 for the incentivized group and 79.2 for 
the non-incentivized group. The Cohen’s d value for effect size was .56. 
 The third and fourth tests were each run as one-way ANOVAs to answer 
the questions about the differences in the mean online homework scores and 
the mean final exam scores, respectively. These two tests separated the 
students by when the incentive was given to the class. The fall 2016 students 
were told of the contingency-based reward on the first day of class, with 
frequent reminders of the standard and dividend. The fall and spring semester 
students of 2015-2016 were allotted the 5 bonus point incentive 2 weeks prior 
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to the semester’s end.  For the spring 2015, no incentive was given. The 
results of the online homework grade comparison was F(2, 213)= 3.612, p< 
.05. However, a post hoc Tukey’s test demonstrated no difference between 
the early and late incentivized groups (p = .70), and no difference between 
early and no-incentives (p=.42). A significant difference exists between the 
late and no-incentive group (p=.02). The Cohen’s d value for effect size was 
.59. 
 Similar results were found in the overall groupings when compared for 
final exam scores. Here, the respective 213 students’ results were F(2, 211)= 
3.166, p<.05. Recognizing the significant differences, the post hoc test 
demonstrated a significant difference between the early and late incentivized 
groups (p = .03), though there was no difference between early and no-
incentives (p=.42). Likewise, there was no difference between the late and 
no-incentive group (p=.34). 
 With respect to the correlation between online homework scores and final 
exam scores, the r value was .258, showing a weak positive relationship. The 
r square value was approximately .07, or only 7% of the variation in final 
exam scores can be explained by the variation in the online homework score. 
Nonetheless, the results were again significant with p< .001. The Cohen’s d 
value for effect size was .53. Lastly, in the chi square test for independence, 
the results were χ2(2)= 50.549, p< .0001. The Cramer’s V test for association 
also showed a significant value with p<.0001. There is therefore a 
relationship applicable to the population with respect to the qualitative 
variables of time of incentive and yes/no status for meeting the bonus quality 
standard.  
 
Discussion 
 
The findings of this research suggest that college students thrive when 
incentivized. When compared to the students who were not incentivized, the 
incentivized group had a statistically significantly higher mean for both 
online homework scores and final exam scores. Many of the incentivized 
students chose to take the opportunity to earn the bonus points to increase the 
final semester grade, which apparently also helped to increase the content 
knowledge necessary for the final exam. Though adding to the current body 
of literature, this research is specific to the college mathematics student. 
Nonetheless, the results adhere with the prior studies that suggested that 
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extrinsic rewards do no harm to intrinsic motivations (Black & Deci, 2000; 
Cameron et al., 2001; Pittman, Boggiano, & Ruble, 1983; Rassouli, 2012; 
Vansteenkiste et al., 2004; Vansteenkiste et al., 2006) as well as those that 
take their discussion to state that autonomous-supportive rewards allow the 
increase in interest and therefore positively impact learning.  
 Moreover, when re-grouped to demonstrate the timeliness of the 5 bonus 
point for earning a 100% on the online homework incentive, the results once 
again showed a significant difference in the means for the online homework. 
Although the early and late homework means were not necessarily significant 
from the no-incentives group in the post hoc tests, both of the incentivized 
groups had much greater numbers participating in achieving the standard 
than those who were not offered the reward. The early incentives group from 
the fall 2016 semester had 25 of 60 (about 42%) students earn the standard; 
when backtracked by week for the early incentivized group, the data shows 
that 13 of 60 (about 22%) students kept the 100% online homework score 
throughout the entire semester. (Unfortunately, the nature of this ex post 
facto study did not allow for re-counting in the semesters prior to fall 2016.)  
By comparison, the late incentives group had 26 of 72 (about 36%) students 
earn the 100% on the online homework, and only 5 of 85 (about 6%) students 
from the late incentives group in the 2015 spring semester earned the top 
grade. The results did demonstrate a significant difference in the means for 
the late and no-incentive groups. The nature of the one way ANOVA focused 
solely in the factor of the timeliness of the incentive being given, apparently 
serving as strong motivator to enhance final course grades closest to the end 
of the semester rather than earlier on in the course or not at all.  
 The ANOVA analysis of final exam scores appears to support the theories 
concerning deeper learning and possibly classroom engagement, as reported 
by Deci (1971). That is, since they did the work based on the incentive, the 
externally motivated students were better able to comprehend what was 
happening in class thereby making them more aware of the knowledge gaps 
that they need to close. This result provides further evidence of the DeVahl 
et al. (2005) claims concerning academic incentives and student behaviors. 
The students tried harder based upon the incentive and were able to form 
deeper connections to the class content, thereby improving their final exam 
scores as compared to the late and no-incentive groups. The early and late 
incentives groups were overt in their engagement of the behaviors and 
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knowledge embedded in the programmed instruction (Miller & Mallott, 
1997).  
 Finally, when the relationships are examined, both the quantitative and 
qualitative questions again proved significant. Each class had the same online 
homework system with the same questions, taught by the same professor with 
the same lesson plans: the external motivator of 5 bonus points was the only 
measureable difference in the classes by semester. Although there is only a 
weak positive correlation between online homework scores and final exam 
grades, the results remain significant at the 5% level. However, the 
correlational value of r = .258 explains only 7% of the variation in the 
dependent variable exam results. One explanation is that the discriminating 
variable of time of incentive could have affected this test in a negative 
manner if students were cramming rather than understanding the content at a 
deeper level. Despite the coefficient of determination and the timeliness of 
the incentive, the results demonstrated that there is a relationship between 
earning the criterion standard of 100% (i.e. motivation) and exam score.  
 In future semesters, I will certainly be providing the incentive early in in 
the semester to provide them with the opportunity to develop interest and 
transform the external reward into internal motivation and autonomous goal-
setting. Similar to Rassouli’s (2012) findings, it will continue to be essential 
to keep the incentive in the autonomous-support category of external 
motivation so that students do not feel coerced but rather supported with the 
external rewards closely aligned with the goal of learning. In conclusion, 
regardless of the criticisms on the effects of external rewards’ negative 
influence in educational settings (Akin-Little et al., 2004) these results show 
a practice worth continuing. 
 
Limitations 
 
Although the results in this study are promising, some general limitations and 
suggestions for future study exist. For instance, the 215 students involved in 
this study represent only the population of students in private universities 
whose ACT test scores approximate the national average that mimics the 
national average. Additionally, although the results demonstrated a medium 
effect size, this may be considered less impactful to the general population. 
Finally, as is the case with most research, a longer study involving more 
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students and a different collection of instructors could possibly change the 
results. 
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